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THE ISRAELI ANTI-BOYCOTT LAW: 
BALANCING THE NEED FOR 
NATIONAL LEGITIMACY AGAINST THE 
RIGHTS OF DISSENTING INDIVIDUALS 
INTRODUCTION  
n July 11, 2011, the Israeli Parliament—the Knesset—
approved the controversial Law for Prevention of Dam-
age to the State of Israel through Boycott (“Anti-Boycott Law”, 
or “ABL”) which instituted civil penalties for Israeli citizens 
who organize or publicly endorse boycotts against the country.1 
The immediate, polarizing impact of the legislation resulted in 
a charged Israeli populace, and rhetoric on both sides grew in-
creasingly extreme.2 Critics slam the ABL as an impermissible 
strike against the fundamental rights of free speech and free 
expression.3 To infringe on such basic rights, they argue, is to 
strike a blow against democracy and to take a step along the 
path toward fascism.4 Conversely, supporters defend the ABL 
as a mechanism to combat damaging economic protests against 
																																																																																																																												
 1. Law Preventing Harm to the State of Israel by Means of Boycott, 5771-
2011, S.H. No. 2304 p. 1 (Isr.). [hereinafter ABL]; Edmund Sanders, Israel 
Law Targets Boycott Campaigns, L.A. TIMES (July 12, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/12/world/la-fg-israel-boycott-20110712 
(reporting that the ABL was approved by a 47-38 vote); Lahav Harkov, Anti-
boycott bill becomes law after passing Knesset, JERUSALEM POST (July 11, 
2011), http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=228896. 
 2. See Bradley Burston, Israel’s boycott law: the quiet sound of going fas-
cist, HA’ARETZ (July 12, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/a-special-place-
in-hell/israel-s-boycott-law-the-quiet-sound-of-going-fascist-1.372881.; but see, 
Harriet Sherwood, Israel’s boycott ban draws fire from law professors, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 14, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/14/israel-boycott-ban-criticised 
(quoting Prime Minister Netanyahu as saying that the criticisms of the ABL 
were “reckless, irresponsible attacks against the legitimate attempt by a de-
mocracy on the defensive to draw a line between what is acceptable and what 
is not.”). 
 3. Editorial, Not Befitting a Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/opinion/18mon2.html (quoting the Anti-
Defamation League warning that the ABL “impinged on the basic democratic 
rights of Israelis to freedom of speech and freedom of expression,” and 
Ha’Aretz that the ABL was “undemocratic.”). 
 4. See Burston, supra note 2. 
O
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Israel’s policies regarding the settlements in the West Bank.5 
To these supporters, protests against the state of Israel from 
within its own population risks the de-legitimization of the Is-
raeli government in the eyes of the world.6 These supporters 
are quickly reminded by ABL opponents, though, that some 
major international entities have already expressed dismay 
over the ABL, criticizing the un-democratic nature of the law.7 
With both sides of the ABL debate firmly entrenched, the Is-
raeli Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”)8 will have to render a 
decisive interpretation, determining if the ABL is a valid exer-
cise of the Knesset’s legislative authority.9 Despite what may 
seem like a clear-cut violation of traditionally protected indi-
vidual rights, the outcome of a challenge to the ABL is far from 
certain. Israel has no formal constitution, and lacks codified 
protection for the values of free speech and free expression.10 
Therefore, in order to strike down the ABL, the Supreme Court 
must construe these protections from Israeli legal tradition, 
without the benefit of being able to point to a statute codifying 
free expression.11 Yet, given the body of Israeli free speech and 
																																																																																																																												
 5. It is common practice for groups critical of Israeli policy to undertake 
“boycotts, disinvestment and sanctions” (“BDS”) against Israel. Not Befitting 
a Democracy, supra note 3. Left-wing activists have embraced such tactics, 
even within Israel, as a method to protest the more right-leaning govern-
ment. Israeli Lawmakers Pass West Bank Settlement Boycott Law, BBC NEWS 
– MIDDLE EAST (July 11, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
14111925. 
 6. See M.J. Rosenberg, Op-Ed, Delegitimization is Just a Distraction, L.A. 
TIMES (July 17, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/17/opinion/la-oe-
rosenberg-israel-20110717. 
 7. See, e.g. Jonathan Lis & Danna Harman, European Union expresses 
concern over Israel’s new boycott law, HA’ARETZ (July 13, 2011), 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/european-union-expresses-
concern-over-israel-s-boycott-law-1.373076; Natasha Mozgovaya & Shlomo 
Shamir, U.S. on Israeli boycott law: Freedom to protest is basic democratic 
right, HA’ARETZ (July 12, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-
defense/u-s-on-israeli-boycott-law-freedom-to-protest-is-a-basic-democratic-
right-1.372884.  
 8. For the purposes of this Note, “Supreme Court” refers to the highest 
court of Israel unless otherwise noted. 
 9. E.g., Edmund Sanders, Israel Struggles with Free-Speech Rights, L.A. 
TIMES (July 21, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/31/world/la-fg-
israel-free-speech-20110731. 
 10. See infra notes 12–15. 
 11. Israeli legal tradition—that is, the potential sources of law to which 
the Supreme Court can look when making their decisions—include Israeli 
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free expression jurisprudence, as well as international norms 
and policy concerns, the Israeli Supreme Court should overturn 
the ABL as an impermissible intrusion on fundamental rights. 
Part I of this note provides some background information on 
the Israeli legal system and the authority of the Supreme 
Court. Part II examines the ABL itself, the political climate in 
which the law was passed, and the reaction thereto. Part III 
examines the relevant precedent regarding the protection of 
free speech and free expression, first under Israeli legal tradi-
tion and then under both foreign and Jewish traditions. Final-
ly, Part IV explains why those precedents reviewed in Part III, 
combined with relevant policy concerns, mandate that the Su-
preme Court invalidate the ABL. 
I. THE ISRAELI LEGAL SYSTEM 
Any arguments for or against the validity of the ABL must be 
evaluated in light of the constraints and policies of the Israeli 
legal system. Section A of this Part will discuss the constitu-
tional history of Israel and how the country has evolved to 
compensate for the lack of a formal written instrument. Section 
B will examine the power of the Supreme Court within Israel’s 
quasi-constitutional framework and also the interaction be-
tween the Supreme Court and the Knesset. By the end of this 
Part it will be clear that if the ABL is violative of Israeli law, 
the Supreme Court has the power to strike it down. 
A. Israeli Constitutional Law 
Unlike America, Israel lacks a formal constitution to provide 
direction in answering potential questions regarding basic hu-
man rights protections.12 Upon achieving statehood in 1948, 
the Israeli Declaration of Independence “stipulated that a con-
stitution would be drafted,” but no such document was ever 
																																																																																																																												
statutes, Israeli common law, international precedent (including American) 
and the teachings and values of Judaism (“Jewish law”). See generally Daniel 
Friedmann, The Effect of Foreign Law on the Law of Israel: Remnants of the 
Ottoman Period, 10 ISR. L. REV. 192 (1975); Uriel Gorney, American Precedent 
in the Supreme Court of Israel, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1194 (1955). 
 12. Dalia Dorner, Does Israel Have a Constitution?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1325 (1999); See also SUZIE NAVOT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL 35 
(2007) (“Israel has no one official document known as ‘the constitution.’”). 
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produced.13 Over time, in place of a unified constitution, the 
Knesset passed a series of eleven mostly procedural regulations 
called the “Basic Laws,” which outlined the organization 
framework of the Israeli legal system and provided protection 
for some fundamental human rights.14 Taken together, the 
Basic Laws comprise a de facto constitution that distills the 
essence of Israeli “constitutional principles.”15 
B. The Israeli Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has two different functions. First, it 
serves as the final court for appeals coming from the lower lev-
els of the Israeli court system. Second, it acts as the High Court 
of Justice, with original jurisdiction to hear “matters in which 
it deems it necessary to grant relief for the sake of justice and 
which are not within the jurisdiction of another court.”16 In 
practice, the role of the High Court of Justice has often been to 
resolve pending constitutional or administrative issues.17 How-
ever, unlike the American Supremacy Clause, Israeli law con-
tained no expression of the Basic Laws’ supremacy over other 
national legislation,18 resulting, for many years, in the Su-
preme Court’s inability to invalidate legislation with any clear 
																																																																																																																												
 13. Maya Tarr, Regulating the Airwaves in Israeli’s Burgeoning Democra-
cy: Why the Israeli High Court of Justice Should Have Acknowledged Free 
Speech in the Case of Artuz Seven,18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 687, 691–92 
(2010). The inability to pass a formal constitution is likely due to “divergent 
views” on constitutional principles within Israel’s “heterogeneous” society. Id. 
at 692; see also Ruth Gavison, Law, Adjudication, Human Rights, and Socie-
ty, 40 ISR. L. REV. 31, 50 (2007). 
 14. NAVOT, supra note 12, at 36–37. The eleven basic laws are The Knesset 
(1958); Israeli Lands (1960); The President of the State (1964); The Govern-
ment (1968); The State Economy (1975); Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel 
(1980); The Judiciary (1984); The State Comptroller (1986); Freedom of Occu-
pation (1992); and Human Dignity and Liberty (1992). Id. at 37. 
 15. Asher Maoz, Constitutional Law, in THE LAW OF ISRAEL: GENERAL 
SURVEYS at 6 (Itzhak Zamir & Sylvain Colombo eds., 1995). 
 16. See Basic Law: The Judiciary, 5744-1984, 38 LSI 101, §15 (1984) (Isr.), 
available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic8_eng.htm. 
 17. Tarr, supra note 13, at 696. 
 18. Compare Aharon Barak, Human Rights in Israel, 39 ISR. L. REV. 12, 17 
(2006), with Bradford R. Clark, Symposium: Separation of Powers as a Safe-
guard of Federalism: Article: Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy 
Clause, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1421, 1422 (2008) (noting that the Supremacy 
Clause provides order the hierarchy of American law by naming the Consti-
tution as part of the “supreme Law of the Land.”). 
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authority.19 This hesitancy changed in 1995, with the landmark 
Supreme Court decision in United Mizrachi Bank v. Migdal 
Agricultural Cooperative,20 in which the Supreme Court decid-
ed that two of the Basic Laws,21 Human Dignity and Freedom 
of Occupation (“Human Rights Basic Laws”), would constitute 
an Israeli “Bill of Rights,” supreme to other legislation.22 The 
Supreme Court reasoned that the Human Rights Basic Laws 
grant the power of judicial review over “the failure of a regular 
law to meet [the Human Rights Basic Laws’] requirements . . . 
such a law is constitutionally flawed and the Court may declare 
it void.”23 Since Migdal, the Supreme Court has been far more 
aggressive in invalidating legislation that conflicts with the 
Human Rights Basic Laws.24 Thus, having granted itself the 
power of judicial review, the Supreme Court has established its 
own authority to strike down the ABL should it find that the 
ABL conflicts with the protections of the Human Rights Basic 
Laws.25 
																																																																																																																												
 19. Tarr, supra note 13, at 691. Tarr notes the lack of a law addressing the 
superiority of the Basic Laws over other legislation as a possible source for 
the Supreme Court’s historical hesitance to exercise Judicial Review over the 
decisions of the Knesset. Id. at 692. 
 20. CA 6821/93 United Mizrachi Bank v. Migdal Agricultural Collective 
49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.). 
 21. Prior to 1992, the Basic Laws were purely organizational and lacked 
“meaningful safeguarding of substantive values.” Tarr, supra note 13, at 692. 
The passage of the Human Rights Basic Laws has been called Israel’s “consti-
tutional revolution” for its recognition and codification of protected civil 
rights and its role in providing for judicial review. Barak, supra note 18, at 
18. 
 22. CA 6821/93 Migdal Agricultural Collective, at 139–40. 
 23. Id. at 139. Migdal has been described as “the Israeli equivalent of 
Marbury v. Madison.” Tarr, supra note 13, at 695. 
 24. Barak, supra note 18, at 21. 
 25. See supra notes 19–23. However, currently pending before the Su-
preme Court (presented in April 2012) is a proposed Basic Law that would 
provide the Knesset with the authority to override a Supreme Court veto by 
vote of a sixty-five member super majority (out of 120). Lahav Harkov, Joan-
na Paraszczuk, Rivlin Voices Support for Basic Law on Legislation, 
JERUSALEM POST (Apr. 8, 2012), 
http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=265290. Under 
the proposed Basic Law: Legislation, the Knesset would have the power to 
enact legislation in spite of the Supreme Court’s opposition, potentially strip-
ping the Supreme Court of its deciding vote on the ABL. See id. Supporters of 
the new Basic Law view it as protection against the whims of the branch of 
government least accountable to the general public, while critics worry that 
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II. THE ABL 
After establishing the proper authority for evaluating the va-
lidity of the ABL, the focus of the following Part turns to the 
ABL itself. Section A of this Part will address the history un-
derlying the ABL and the political motivations of each side of 
the debate. Section B will examine the actual terms of the ABL 
and how they could affect individuals. Section C will address 
both the negative and positive reactions to the passage of the 
ABL. By the end of this Part, the reader will better understand 
the political motivations weighing on each side of the ABL dis-
cussion. 
A. Origins of the Conflict 
Israel occupies a precarious geographical place near the cen-
ter of the Muslim world, surrounded by potentially hostile na-
tions.26 Since its inception in 1948, Israel has fought numerous 
wars for its very survival and its right to exist as a nation.27 
Even when not faced with imminent, traditional warfare, pro-
testors still threaten Israel’s legitimacy through economic war-
fare, specifically the practice of boycotts, disinvestment, and 
sanctions (“BDS”)28 meant to weaken Israel’s economy.29 Today, 
Israel’s policies regarding the West Bank settlements are in-
creasingly controversial30 and, in protest, opponents of Israeli 
policy have participated in international movements advocat-
																																																																																																																												
the Knesset is simply removing the last remaining check on its growing pow-
er. See Nathan Jeffay, Israel in Power Struggle with Top Court, JEWISH DAILY 
FORWARD (Apr. 29, 2012), http://forward.com/articles/155370/israel-in-power-
struggle-with-top-court/. 
 26. See, e.g., Samuel W. Lewis, United States and Israel: the Evolution of 
an Unwritten Alliance, 53 MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 364, 373–78 (1999). 
 27. See id. at 364–75. 
 28. See Rosenberg, supra note 6. 
 29. See, e.g., MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22424, THE 
ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL (2006) (“The Arab League has maintained 
an official boycott of Israeli companies and Israeli-made goods since the 
founding of Israel in 1948.”). 
 30. Ethan Bronner, Amid Statehood Bid, Tensions Simmer in West Bank, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/24/world/middleeast/west-bank-tensions-
simmer-amid-palestinian-united-nations-statehood-bid.html?pagewanted=all. 
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ing the use of BDS tactics.31 Such tactics have been advocated 
by a diverse group of supporters ranging from “international, 
radical pro-Palestine campaigners, Western liberals, and Israe-
li leftists.”32 It is this third group (Israeli leftists) that seems to 
have particularly caught the attention of Israeli lawmakers 
such as Knesset member Zeev Elkin, the sponsor of the ABL, 
who noted that he was concerned that the boycotts have “in-
creasingly come from within our own midst.” 33 In 2011, some 
Israelis began calling for boycotts of products with links to the 
West Bank settlements.34 In response, Elkin, a member of 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party, proposed 
the ABL as a way to alleviate the damage felt by West Bank 
businesses as a result of the boycott campaigns.35 The Knesset 
passed the ABL by a margin of forty-seven to thirty-eight.36 
B. The Provisions of the ABL 
The ABL defines a boycott as “deliberately avoiding econom-
ic, cultural or academic ties with another person or body solely 
because of their affinity with the State of Israel, one of its insti-
tutions or an area under its control, in such a way that may 
cause economic, cultural or academic damage.”37 Under the 
ABL, it is a civil offense to: 
																																																																																																																												
 31. Natalie Rothschild, Op-Ed, Criticism of Boycott Bill by BDS Supporters 
in Israel and Abroad Rings Hollow, YNET NEWS (July 13, 2011), 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4094647,00.html. 
 32. Id.; see also, Peter Beinart, To Save Israel, Boycott the Settlements, NY 
TIMES (Mar. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/19/opinion/to-save-
israel-boycott-the-settlements.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all; Jacob Edelist, 
Major British Supermarket Chain Tightens Boycott of Israeli Goods, Compa-
nies, JEWISH PRESS (Apr. 29, 2012), 
http://www.jewishpress.com/news/israel/major-british-supermarket-chain-
tightens-boycott-of-israeli-goods-companies/2012/04/29/. 
 33. Not Befitting a Democracy, supra note 3. 
 34. Joel Greenberg, Israeli Anti-Boycott Law Stirs Debate on Settlement 
Products, WASH. POST (July 22, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/israeli-anti-boycott-law-
stirs-debate-on-settlement-products/2011/07/20/gIQA91LyTI_story.html. 
Elkin stated that he sponsored the ABL in order to “provide legal recourse to 
people harmed by boycott campaigns that targeted them because of where 
they happen to live.” Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Harkov, supra note 1. 
 37. ABL, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
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knowingly publish[] a public call for a boycott against the 
State of Israel, where according to the content and circum-
stances of the publication there is reasonable probability that 
the call will lead to a boycott, and he who published the call 
was aware of this possibility.38 
Should an individual deliberately call for a boycott in violation 
of this provision, then that individual may be liable for “[puni-
tive] damages that are independent of the [amount of] actual 
damage caused.”39 
C. Response to the ABL 
Response to the passage of the ABL was immediate and vig-
orous; supporters defended the bill passionately, while oppo-
nents petitioned the Supreme Court to overturn it within days 
of its passage.40 Supporters of the ABL view the law as a pro-
tection against the threat boycotts pose to the very legitimacy 
of the Israeli government,41 as well as protection against the 
economic and social prejudices these boycotts place upon Israeli 
businesses.42 The threat to legitimacy posed by BDS actions is 
especially problematic for Israel because such actions shift dis-
cussion from questions about Israel’s policies to questions over 
																																																																																																																												
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. “In calculating the sum of these damages, for example, the court 
will take into consideration, among other things, the circumstances under 
which the wrong was carried out, its severity and its extent.” Id. 
 40. See Boycott Law May Backfire on Israel, RUSSIA TODAY (July 14, 2011), 
http://www.rt.com/news/boycott-law-israel-backfire/; see also Burston, supra 
note 2. But see, Karni Eldad, Israel’s Boycott Law is Constitutional, (July 18, 
2001), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/israel-s-boycott-law-is-
constitutional-1.373800. The state of Israel filed its defense of the ABL with 
the Supreme Court in January, 2012. See Joanna Paraszczuk, Boycott Law 
Constitutional Despite Difficulties, JERUSALEM POST (Jan. 18, 2012), 
http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=254084. Indeed, Ahmed 
Tibi, a member of Knesset, has gone so far as to directly challenge the ABL, 
publicly calling for a Canadian boycott of Israeli goods. Lahav Harkov, MK 
Tibi Break Boycott Law on Trip to Canada, JERUSALEM POST (Apr. 17, 2012), 
http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=266368. 
 41. In South Africa, the threat of a boycott caused a massive exodus of 
foreign investment, which in turn put heavy economic pressure on the South 
African government. See Jennifer Frankel, Note, The Legal and Regulatory 
Climate for Investment in Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Historical Over-
view, 6 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 183, 191–93 (1998). 
 42. See Eldad, supra note 40; Greenberg, supra note 34. 
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Israel’s very economic viability.43 Supporters argue that, given 
such a clear threat, the ABL presents a reasonable and propor-
tional restriction on the freedom of expression when balanced 
against the interest of state security.44 Alternatively, opponents 
of the ABL argue that delegitimization is not an appropriate 
fear given Israel’s relative strength and prosperity,45 and that 
the public’s interest in maintaining the basic right of political 
speech is far too important to be abridged for such a nebulous 
and long-term threat.46 
III. ANALYSIS 
Freedom of expression47 and democracy are inextricably 
linked.48 Free expression rights “facilitate individuals in form-
ing and joining groups for advocacy and action,” which serve as 
“indispensable features” of modern society.49 Given the im-
portance of expressive rights, many countries have provided 
explicit guarantees of the freedom of expression.50 Israel is no 
exception, as it legally recognizes “all human rights that char-
acterize modern democracy,”51 among which it counts the free-
dom of expression. Therefore, the following sections will look at 
the history of freedom of expression law in Israel, as well as 
internationally, to determine whether the ABL falls within the 
scope of the protection granted to this particular right. 
																																																																																																																												
 43. Working Group Report, Co-Chairs Mitchell Bard & Gil Troy, Delegiti-
mization of Israel: Boycotts, Divestment and Sanctions, GLOBAL FORUM FOR 
COMBATING ANTI-SEMITISM (2009), 
http://www.gfantisemitism.org/Conference2009/Working-
Groups/Pages/WorkingGroupReports.aspx. 
 44. Eldad, supra note 40 (noting that the ABL is limited only to the sort of 
public calls for boycott that could actually threaten the state, still allowing 
every Israeli “to buy whatever he wants.”). 
 45. Rosenberg, supra note 6. 
 46. See Burston, supra note 2. 
 47. For the purposes of this Note, freedom of expression will be used as a 
“catch-all” term incorporating any protected political right, including speech, 
assembly, participation, and association. 
 48. See Henry J. Steiner, Two Sides of the Same Coin?: Democracy and 
International Human Rights, 41 ISR. L. REV. 445, 446–47 (2008). 
 49. Id. at 447. 
 50. See, e.g., infra Part III.B.1. 
 51. Barak, supra note 18, at 13. 
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A. Israeli Freedom of Expression 
For years, protection of political expression existed in the Is-
raeli common law without “statutory support.”52 In 1992, the 
Knesset passed the Human Rights Basic Laws, giving this pro-
tection a textual home and providing the Supreme Court with 
an avenue for invalidating legislation that challenged it.53 The 
Human Rights Basic Laws provide explicit protection from 
deprivation of the right to “human dignity, liberty, property, 
privacy, freedom of occupation, and freedom from detention, 
imprisonment, and extradition.”54 However, this protection is 
limited, making exceptions for violations of the Human Rights 
Basic Laws made (1) in response to a valid threat to the State 
of Israel and (2) narrowly tailored to meeting only the desired 
end.55 Accordingly, any violation of a protected right must be 
evaluated in terms of its justification and proportionality to 
meeting that end.56 
Freedom of expression is not explicitly provided for in the 
Human Rights Basic Laws,57 so in order to receive the same 
protections listed above, the Supreme Court must interpret the 
law to find that expression is implicitly included.58 The Su-
preme Court has consistently done so by reading freedom of 
expression into the explicit guarantee of human dignity provid-
ed for in the text of the Human Rights Basic Laws.59 Despite 
																																																																																																																												
 52. Id. 
 53. See supra Part II.A. 
 54. Barak, supra note 18 at 16. 
 55. See Basic Law: Human Dignity, 5754-1994, SH No. 1454, §8 (1994) 
(Isr.) (“No violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting 
the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an ex-
tent no greater than is required.”); see also Barak, supra note 18, at 16. 
 56. See NAVOT, supra note 12, at 41–42. 
 57. HCJ 2557/05 Majority Camp v. Israel Police (2) IsrLR 399, 409 [2006] 
(Isr.). 
 58. Tarr, supra note 13, at 695. 
 59. Barak, supra note 18, at 12, 16; Zaharah R. Markoe, Note, Expressing 
Oneself Without a Constitution: The Israeli Story, 8 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 319 (2000). This construction of the Human Rights Basic Law has become 
the accepted standard for the breadth of protection provided by the Basic 
Laws. See, e.g. HCJ 4804/94 Station Film Co. Ltd. v. Film Review Board 
IsrLR 1, 13 [1997] (Isr.); PPA 4463/94 Golan v. Prison Service IsrLR 1, 18, 58 
[1995–1996] (Isr.) (“Even without an express provision, freedom of speech is 
included in human dignity, according to the meaning thereof in sections 2 
and 4 of the Basic Law. For what is human dignity without the basic liberty 
of an individual to hear the speech of others and to utter his own speech.”). 
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the constant security threats facing Israel,60 the Supreme 
Court’s integration of free expression into the fabric of the 
Basic Laws is also consistent with the attitudes of the Israeli 
populace, who have indicated support for “abstract democratic 
principles” on a level consistent with that of the American pop-
ulace.61 Since free expression is entitled to the protection of the 
Supreme Court under the Human Rights Basic Laws, any vio-
lation thereof can only be justified if legislation in question is: 
(1) in response to a valid threat to the State of Israel and (2) 
narrowly tailored to meeting only the desired end.62 
Free expression jurisprudence in Israel dates back to the 
landmark decision in Kol Ha-Am v. Minister of the Interior,63 in 
which the Supreme Court held free expression to be a supreme 
right, well before the passage of the Basic Law: Human Digni-
ty.64 In Kol Ha-Am, the Israeli Interior Minister had shut down 
an Israeli newspaper, which had criticized Israel for its support 
of military action in Korea, because he saw it as a potential 
threat to the state’s safety.65 The Supreme Court held that be-
cause free expression was such a “fundamental right,”66 it can-
not be abridged without being able to forecast serious danger 
“almost to a certainty.”67 In this case, Supreme Court found 
																																																																																																																												
 60. See supra Part II.A. 
 61. JULIE L. ANDSAGER ET AL., FREE EXPRESSION IN 5 DEMOCRATIC PUBLICS 
122 (2004). 
 62. See supra Part II.A; Basic Law: Human Dignity, supra note 55, at §8. 
 63. HCJ 75/53 Kol Ha-Am v. Minister of the Interior 7 PD 871 [1953] (Isr.). 
 64. See id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. The right to free expression is fundamental because 
[d]emocracy consists, first and foremost, of government by consent, 
the opposite of government maintained by the power of the mailed 
fist; and the democratic process, therefore, is one of selection of the 
common aims of the people and the means of achieving them, 
through the public form of negotiation and discussion, that is to say, 
by open debate and the free exchange of ideas on matters of public 
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general elections and debates in the legislature - and it plays that 
part not only when the citizen goes to the polls, but at all times and 
in all seasons. 
Id. at 7 (citation omitted). 
 67. Id. at 27 (“In the light of circumstances, that the publication makes it 
possible, amounting almost to a certainty, that serious harm will be caused to 
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that the threat alleged by the Interior Minister, that of de-
creased confidence in the Israeli government, was insuffi-
cient.68 
After the passage of the Human Rights Basic Laws, the Kol 
Ha-Am near certainty standard was approved legislatively in 
the Basic Law: Human Dignity.69 Just a few years after the 
codification of this rule, the Supreme Court took to expanding 
on the “near certainty” standard for modern application. In 
Station Film Co. Ltd. v. Film Review Board, the Supreme 
Court held that free expression rights (in this case, the ability 
to exhibit a provocative film) were not limitless, and could be 
abridged “in order to advance societal goals, such as ensuring 
the country’s very existence and democratic nature, as well as 
protecting the integrity of the judicial system, as well as public 
peace and security.”70 However, the Supreme Court clarified 
that in order to justify abridging free expression the perceived 
threats must be nearly certain.71 Drawing on the Kol Ha-Am 
near certainty test, the Supreme Court explained the appropri-
ate balance as follows: 
Freedom of expression may be impaired if the following two 
conditions are satisfied. First the harm the expression causes 
to the public peace must be serious, grave, and severe. The 
harm must exceed the “level of tolerance” acceptable in a 
democratic society and shake that society to its very founda-
tion. Second, the probability of such an injury to public peace 
occurring must be nearly certain. It is insufficient to say that 
the harm be only possible and probable.72 
In practice, the Supreme Court need not always follow this 
test verbatim, but instead has the discretion to “adopt a suita-
ble test, while considering the substance and importance of 
competing principles . . . with respect to their relative priority 
and the measure of protection which we would like to grant 
each principle or interest.”73 For artistic censorship cases, like 
																																																																																																																												
the public peace, then there is nothing to prevent him from exercising the 
power.”). 
 68. See generally id. 
 69. Compare id., with Basic Law: Human Dignity, supra note 55, at §8. 
 70. HCJ 4804/94 Station Film at 15. 
 71. Id at 17. 
 72. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73. HCJ 448/85 Daher v. Minister of the Interior 40(2) IsrSC 701, 708 
[1985] (emphasis in original). 
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Station Film, the Supreme Court has typically allowed for 
punctures in the cloak of free expression protection.74 For ex-
ample, in Israel Film Studios v. Levi Geri, the Supreme Court 
determined that a newsreel that presented an obviously biased 
and misleading picture of a political topic did not need to be 
protected because of “the newsreel’s unique ability to affect the 
audience through its visual medium.”75 However, in cases 
where the act of expression is not pure fiction, like Station 
Film, or heavily biased (like Israel Film Studios), the Supreme 
Court has been much more hesitant to restrict expression, even 
if that expression is critical of Israeli policy.76 This hesitancy 
was on full display when the Supreme Court held, in Bakri v. 
Israel Film Council, that a documentary portraying Palestinian 
reactions to Israeli terrorist activities merited the court’s pro-
tection even though it may have been anti-Israel and “offen-
sive.”77 
Beyond the context of artistic expression, the Supreme 
Court’s application of the Kol Ha-am near certainty test has 
skewed even more heavily toward protection of the rights of 
individuals.78 In Majority Camp v. Israel Police, the Supreme 
Court ruled that an interest group seeking to stage a rally in 
support of a particular government action had the fundamental 
right to demonstrate publicly.79 Similarly, in Levi v. Southern 
District Police Commander, the Supreme Court held that the 
Israeli Police did not have the ability to deny protestors the 
right to demonstrate unless the police could show “substantial 
evidence” of harm to public security.80 In Levi, the Committee 
against the War in Lebanon, an anti-war advocacy group, had 
applied for a permit to stage a march against political vio-
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 76. See HCJ 316/03 Bakri v. Israel Film Council 58(1) PD 249[2003] (Isr.); 
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lence.81 The Israeli police denied the permit application on the 
grounds that it was being planned for the anniversary of the 
murder of a leader in the peace movement and the police feared 
that the protest would incite violence and threaten public safe-
ty.82 The Supreme Court found the police’s “serious apprehen-
sion over a grave threat to public order and security” was not 
enough for the Court to allow them to suspend the protestors’ 
right to express themselves under the clear probability test.83 
However, the Supreme Court does not rule in favor of free 
expression in every instance. For example, in State of Israel v. 
Kahanae, the Supreme Court allowed for a revocation of free 
expression rights in the case of a radical politician, Binyamin 
Kahanae, who had been convicted of sedition for voicing anti-
government rhetoric.84 Kahanae had been distributing pam-
phlets, in response to terrorist attacks, advocating for govern-
ment-sanctioned violence against Arab villages within Israel.85 
After a series of reversals,86 the Supreme Court (using the fa-
miliar language of the Hol Ha-Am test) found a “near certain-
ty” that the defendant’s continued discourse would harm the 
government “structure.”87 The Supreme Court also explained 
that the law of sedition was designed to protect the value of 
“social cohesiveness,” and Kahanae’s actions posed a direct 
threat to this value.88 Furthermore, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that a violation of social cohesiveness presented poten-
tially dire consequences for the state of Israel.89 Taken togeth-
																																																																																																																												
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.; Markoe, supra note 59, at 341. 
 83. HCJ 153/83 Levi at 418–19; Markoe, supra note 59, at 340–41. 
 84. CrimFH 1789/98 State of Israel v. Kahane 54(5) PD 193, 232, 233 
[2000] (Isr.). Sedition in Israeli law is defined as “promot[ing] feelings of ill-
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Arye, Can Freedom of Expression Survive Social Trauma: The Israeli Experi-
ence, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 162–63 (2003). 
 85. CrimFH 1789/98 Kahane at 197. 
 86. The trial court initially acquitted Kahane, but the appellate court con-
victed him on appeal. Gur-Arye, supra note 84, at 168–72. The Supreme 
Court overturned Kahane’s conviction then finally reinstated it upon rehear-
ing. Id.; CrimFH 1789/98 Kahane. 
 87. Id. at 199, 225. 
 88. Id. at 213–15; Gur-Arye, supra note 84, at 170. 
 89. Justice Or noted that the value of social cohesiveness “is of special im-
portance against the background of a society with a varied social mosaic like 
the state of Israel, in which minorities, and members of different religious 
sects, live side by side and in which the differences among the various popu-
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er, the probability and severity of the harm threatened by Ka-
hanae’s actions was enough for the Supreme Court to uphold 
Kahanae’s conviction and to quash his freedom of expression.90 
The final category of expression discussed by the Supreme 
Court, although far less conclusively, is commercial expres-
sion.91 In Kidum Yazmuth U’Molut v. Broadcasting Authority, 
the Supreme Court examined the issue of whether an advertis-
er had the right to display controversial advertisements.92 The 
advertisement in question was the slogan of Kidum, which in 
fact meant “Go Excel,” but also “provoked the connotation” of a 
Hebrew curse word.93 The Israeli Broadcasting Authority de-
cided to prohibit the display of this advertisement on the 
grounds that it “includes an offense to good taste or contradicts 
public order or harms the public.” Kidum filed suit, alleging an 
infringement of their right to free expression.94 The Supreme 
Court agreed with Kidum, finding that the actions of the 
Broadcasting Authority were a violation of Israeli free expres-
sion tradition.95 The Supreme Court cautioned, though, that 
while free expression is a “superlative right” entitled to the 
highest protection of the Court, purely commercial expression 
does not threaten political or democratic participation like oth-
er types of expression and may therefore be subject to lesser 
protection.96 However, the Supreme Court stopped short of cat-
egorizing Kidum’s advertisement as falling outside of this less-
er protection, invalidating the Broadcasting Authority’s deci-
																																																																																																																												
lation groups that live in it are significant. Its value is in ensuring the exist-
ence of a multi-cultural, pluralistic society, and in preventing the disintegra-
tion of the social fabric.” CrimFH 1789/98 Kahane, at 214; Gur-Arye, supra 
note 84, at 170–71. 
 90. See CrimFH 1789/98 Kahane; Gur-Arye, supra note 84, at 170–71. 
 91. See RAPHAEL COHEN ALMAGOR, THE SCOPE OF TOLERANCE: STUDIES ON 
THE COSTS OF FREE EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 94–99 (2006) (de-
scribing in detail H.C.J. 606/93 Kidum Yazmuth U’Molut v. Broadcasting 
Authority 48 (2) PD 8 [1995] (Isr.)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. “Go Excel in Hebrew is lech titzayen. Go Fuck Yourself is lech tiz-
dayen.” Id. at 94 n.35 
 94. Id. at 94. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id.; see also Amit M. Schejter, Art Thou for Us, or for Our Adver-
saries? Communicative Action and the Regulation of Product Placement: A 
Comparative Study and a Tool for Analysis, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 
111 (2006). 
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sion because the commercial expression in question did not “se-
riously offend public sensibilities.”97 
Taken as a whole, Israeli law provides strong protection for 
the rights of individuals to express themselves, so long as that 
expression does not immediately threaten the public order with 
serious harm.98 Given Israel’s precarious political reality,99 
maintaining the proper balance point for Israeli society is a dif-
ficult task.100 However, the Supreme Court has generally pro-
tected the rights of the minority to express themselves, particu-
larly in the political context without evidence of truly extreme 
danger.101 
B. Foreign Freedom of Expression 
1. American Free Expression 
Aside from Israeli law, the Supreme Court often relies on for-
eign precedent to provide guidance on thorny issues of first im-
pression.102 Chief among the bodies of foreign precedent consid-
ered by the Supreme Court is American law, to which the Su-
preme Court turns with frequency.103 Both evolving from the 
British common law model,104 Israeli law and American law 
share many of the same foundational principles and “reason-
ing.”105 
American law distinguishes between political and commercial 
expression in determining the appropriate level of government 
intervention.106 Regarding political expression, American law 
requires that “the government must show an imminent threat 
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of harm before regulating [expression].”107 Indeed, the Ameri-
can concept of “clear and present danger” served as the model 
for the “substantially similar” near certainty test developed by 
the Supreme Court to evaluate violations of the freedom of ex-
pression.108 Within the political expression context, U.S. courts 
have consistently found that the right of citizens to boycott do-
mestic business is unquestionably protected by the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.109 In NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
participants in a damaging boycott of white-owned business 
could not be held liable for damages sustained by local busi-
nesses, because the value of the expression was more im-
portant than the potential harm.110 Commercial expression, on 
the other hand, does not receive the broad constitutional pro-
tection received by political speech in America.111 
However, constitutional protection for boycott expression 
does not extend universally to all potential boycotts. In 1979, in 
response to the Arab boycott of Israel, Congress passed the Ex-
port Administration Act (“EAA”) which prohibited “any United 
States person” from taking action “with intent to comply with, 
further, or support any boycott fostered or imposed by a foreign 
country against a country which is friendly to the United 
States.”112 The seemingly broad reach of the EAA is actually far 
narrower than it first appears.113 The EAA was passed to com-
bat the practice of “secondary boycotts,” whereby the Arab 
countries that were boycotting Israel (the “primary boycott”) 
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would boycott any U.S companies that participated in trade 
with Israel.114 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
addressed the constitutionality of the EAA in Briggs & Stratton 
Corp. v. Baldridge.115 There, Briggs & Stratton, a major Ameri-
can corporation claimed that the EAA violated their free ex-
pression rights because they could not respond to question-
naires116 from Arab companies who were participating in the 
Arab boycott of Israel.117 The Seventh Circuit rejected the cor-
poration’s claims and upheld the provisions of the EAA, distin-
guishing between those strict protections afforded to political 
expression and the lesser protection available for commercial 
expression.118 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit decided that 
Briggs & Stratton’s participation in the Arab questionnaires 
was not political speech because “[Briggs & Stratton] do not 
seek to answer the questionnaire in order to influence the Ar-
abs decision to conduct or enforce a trade boycott with Isra-
el.”119 Instead, filling out the questionnaire was merely com-
mercial speech because Briggs & Stratton’s motivation in fill-
ing out the questionnaires was simply that “they wish[ed] . . . 
to show that the boycott’s sanctions should not be applied to 
them . . . .”120 In further defending the constitutionality of the 
EAA, the Seventh Circuit noted that Briggs and Stratton were, 
“free to communicate their views about the relative merits of 
the Arabs’ political decisions,” and it was only the secondary 
participation in a foreign boycott that was prohibited. 
American law thus clearly defines the boundaries of expres-
sion regulation. Political expression is afforded the heightened 
protection of an imminent danger standard, while commercial 
expression can be infringed at the government’s discretion. In 
the boycott context, the law is similarly clear. Primary boycott-
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ing, that is, direct expressions of political will through econom-
ic measures, is entitled to full free expression protection. Sec-
ondary boycotts, commercial in nature, do not merit similar 
protection. The link between the boycott standard and the gen-
eral expression standard is clear. Where a restriction on ex-
pression or boycott threatens an individual’s ability to partici-
pate in democracy (i.e. political speech or a primary boycott), 
this restriction is impermissible.121 However, where the indi-
vidual’s interests at stake are something less central than 
democratic rights (i.e. economic rights, secondary boycott par-
ticipation), regulation is permitted much more freely.122 
2. International Free Expression 
The international legal community has paid increasing atten-
tion to issues of human rights, particularly with respect to par-
ticipation in the political process.123 Members of that communi-
ty agree that, “everyone has the right to take part in the gov-
ernment of his country,”124 and that “every citizen [has a right] 
to ‘take part’ in the ‘conduct of public affairs.’”125 The U.N. fur-
ther expanded these guarantees in 1996 when they explained 
that it lies implicit in the guarantee of participation in public 
affairs that every citizen have the opportunity to “exert[] influ-
ence through public debate, conduct[] a dialogue with their rep-
resentatives, and exercis[e] their capacity to ‘organize them-
selves.’”126 Such guarantees speak to the high level of im-
portance placed on free expression, especially political expres-
sion, by the international community. 
As for the ABL, its provisions clearly limit the ability for Is-
raeli citizens to “organize themselves” by forming boycotts of 
Israeli products or businesses.127 Furthermore, boycotts cer-
tainly represent the ability of individuals to attempt to take 
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part in government by influencing their countries policies. 
Therefore, the ABL is out of step with the protections for politi-
cal freedom of expression rights advanced by the international 
community with increasing frequency. 
3. Jewish Freedom of Expression 
A central part of Israel’s identity is its status as the “state of 
the Jewish people.”128 Accordingly, the teachings and values of 
Judaism have played a major role in shaping Israel’s legal sys-
tem.129 As a preliminary matter, Israel has established a series 
of religious courts, separate from the secular court system, to 
adjudicate religious issues that may arise.130 For secular 
courts, including the Supreme Court, the precise value of Jew-
ish law as precedent is uncertain.131 What is certain, however, 
is that Jewish law serves, at the very least, as a guideline for 
the moral principles of the state of Israel to which the Supreme 
Court may turn when informing their decisions on difficult is-
sues.132 
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In Jewish tradition, freedom of expression has long existed as 
an implied right within some of Judaism’s oldest and most cen-
tral tenets.133 The foundation of biblical human rights protec-
tion is the central tenet that men were created in the “very im-
age of God,” and therefore each individual is deserving of equal 
respect in relation to every other person.134 From this idea, 
Jewish tradition evolved to protect the ability of individuals to 
express themselves, even when they are in an unpopular mi-
nority, as the thoughts and words of all those created in God’s 
image are entitled to equal respect.135 An early example of free 
expression principles comes from examination of the writings of 
the biblical prophets.136 Despite the fact that every prophet 
claimed to be espousing God’s word, the writings of the proph-
ets were all quite different and often in conflict with one anoth-
er.137 However, the fact that “all [prophets] were permitted to 
function and indeed, as the pages of the Bible bear witness, to 
preserve considerable sections of their literary activity for pos-
terity,” speaks to the importance that early Jewish society 
placed on the ability to express differing viewpoints.138 Similar-
ly, in a dispute between two important Rabbis, the Sanhedrin 
(an ancient high court of Jewish law)139 decided to allow both to 
continue teaching because Judaism thrives on the differing in-
terpretations that come from allowing everyone to express their 
own views.140 
Beyond allowing the existence of disparate and often conflict-
ing viewpoints, Jewish law clearly points to protecting the 
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rights of individuals on a broader level.141 The Book of Leviti-
cus lays the groundwork for the fundamental protection of in-
dividual liberty in stating, “thou shalt proclaim liberty 
throughout the land, unto all the inhabitants thereof.”142 By 
extension, the Torah’s discussion of liberty can be extended to 
individual freedoms, including the freedom of expression.143 
Another core Judaic concept that speaks to a broad protection 
of individual rights is Rabbi Hillel’s classic exhortation, “Do not 
do to another what you would not wish to be done to you – that 
is the whole of Jewish law, everything else is but commentary 
and elaboration.”144 Similarly, “Rabbi Akiba [citing a biblical 
phrase] stated, . . . ‘thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.’”145 
Together, these quotes reflect the idea that, “[o]ne of the fun-
damental principles in Jewish law is that there should be no 
discrimination between individuals, who all alike are created in 
the image of God.”146 Limiting the free expression rights of a 
particular class of individuals is precisely the type of discrimi-
nation prohibited under these tenets because to distinguish be-
tween the value of the expression of different people is to dis-
tinguish between people who were created in the image of 
God.147 Therefore any government action that seeks to discrim-
inate between groups of individuals on the basis of their right 
to express themselves stands in conflict with Jewish legal tra-
dition. 
C. Policy Concerns 
Aside from legal concerns, Israel must also consider the polit-
ical and financial repercussions of the ABL’s passage. First, 
Israel receives an enormous amount of money from its allied 
countries.148 Chief among those allies is the United States.149 
The United States and other members of the international 
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community have voiced their extreme displeasure with the 
ABL.150 Therefore, Israel may risk losing some, indeed perhaps 
a significant portion, of its financial support should it fail to 
strike down the ABL. Second, given the politically charged at-
mosphere in Israel and the Middle East,151 and in light of re-
cent accusations of substandard human rights protections in its 
dealings with the Palestinians,152 Israel risks further damage 
to its own public image. These accusations of human rights vio-
lations have led to international backlash, and mounting an-
ger, against Israeli policy, and Israel may lose precious political 
capital and alienate some of its most loyal allies by affirming 
the ABL.153 Such a delicate political climate speaks to the im-
portance of Israel maintaining a positive public image in the 
international community in order to continue fiscal stability 
and political viability as an independent nation. 
IV. SYNTHESIS 
Regardless of the prism through which it is viewed, be it Is-
raeli law, foreign law, or religious law, the ABL is an imper-
missible violation of the right to free expression. Beginning 
with Israeli law, the Supreme Court allows for restrictions in 
violation of the right to free expression only where the govern-
ment can show both severe harm to the public and a near cer-
tainty that severe is harm flowing from the expression in ques-
tion.154 In contrast with the severity of harm that has been 
deemed sufficiently dangerous to impinge of free expression 
rights, the harm addressed by the ABL is relatively minor. In 
Kahanae, the Supreme Court found that the harm posed by a 
seditious individual who was advocating for the extermination 
of entire villages of Arab-Israelis was sufficiently severe to jus-
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tify infringing on that individual’s right to free expression.155 
Further defining the boundary of free expression, in Bakri, the 
Supreme Court held that the harm posed by the exhibition of a 
film critical of Israel, such as delegitmization and public order, 
was insufficient to meet the severity of harm requirement.156 
Looking at Kahanae and Bakri, the Supreme Court has clearly 
distinguished between physical harm and other more intangi-
ble harms, finding that only when the public faced physical 
danger was the government justified in limiting the freedom of 
expression.157 In the case at hand, the harm that the ABL pur-
ports to prevent is much more analogous to Bakri than to Ka-
hanae. The West Bank boycotts pose no direct threat to human 
safety, amounting only to potential pecuniary damages or de-
legitimization of the government.158 Therefore, the degree of 
harm purported to be protected by the ABL is insufficient to 
require an exemption from the protection of freedom of expres-
sion.159 
The ABL also fails to meet the Kol Ha-Am near certainty 
standard because its harms are far too remote. The Supreme 
Court has established an extremely high bar for the certainty 
with which harm must flow from a particular expression to jus-
tify that expression’s suppression.160 In Kahanae, the Supreme 
Court determined that an active call for violence was sufficient-
ly certain to cause harm to the public, and therefore interfer-
ence with free expression rights was justified.161 However, in 
Levi, the Supreme Court determined that even the police’s “se-
rious apprehension over a grave threat to public order and se-
curity” was not enough certainty to justify restriction.162 To-
gether, Kahanae and Levi reflect the exacting nature of this 
near certainty standard.163 Indeed, the Supreme Court seems 
to have cumulatively stated that an actual call to violence and 
the threat of violence, even when verified by the local police, is 
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not enough to meet the standard.164 In the present case, the 
ABL falls well short of this high bar. Unlike a call to violence, 
the effects of a boycott are quite remote.165 Indeed, it is likely 
that the economic consequences of any boycott on the country 
as a whole would not be felt for some time.166 Applying the high 
bar set by the Supreme Court, the ABL clearly lacks adequate 
justification under the probability prong of the Kol-Ha-Am near 
certainty test. 
Alternatively, supporters of the ABL could argue that, as dis-
cussed in Kidum, the ABL addresses commercial expression 
(boycotts being economic in nature), and therefore may be sub-
ject to a less strict standard.167 After all, the Supreme Court 
has been more lenient in allowing restrictions in the realm of 
film censorship (a commercial activity), as noted in Part III. A 
of this Note.168 Indeed, the argument continues, the expression 
in those cases is most similar to the ABL because they each re-
gard offensive expressions that threaten the public order. 
However, such an argument misses the mark. First, the Su-
preme Court has refrained from actually deciding that com-
mercial expression receives a lower standard, instead merely 
suggesting that it might.169 Second, even if commercial expres-
sion were entitled to a lower standard, the ABL does not deal 
with commercial expression because the Supreme Court distin-
guished commercial expression on the grounds that purely 
commercial expression does not implicate the democratic rights 
of the expressing individual.170 For censorship cases like Sta-
tion Film and Israeli Film Studios, this distinction holds 
true.171 An inability to exhibit one’s creative work does not in-
fringe on one’s ability to participate in the political process, on-
ly one’s ability to make money. By contrast, the ABL strikes at 
the very heart of an individual’s right to participate in the 
democratic process. The boycotts targeted under the ABL are 
clear examples of political expression aimed at the policies of 
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the Israeli government.172 To prevent individuals from partici-
pating in political discourse in this way is precisely the type of 
violation of a “supreme right” that the Supreme Court distin-
guished in Kidum. 
Jewish law will, additionally, advise the Supreme Court that 
the ABL is an invalid exercise of legislative discretion.173 Cu-
mulatively, the totality of Jewish legal tradition speaks to the 
protection of the rights of individuals174 and the Torah provides 
for individuals to be treated freely and without discrimina-
tion.175 The ABL stands in direct conflict with these principles. 
Primarily, by limiting the expression of those unhappy with the 
direction of the Israeli government, the Knesset is running 
afoul of the Jewish tradition of protecting the voices of dissi-
dent elements of society.176 Moreover, the ABL restricts the 
“liberty” of those who seek to engage in boycotts, in direct viola-
tion of the provisions of Leviticus.177 
American law, despite stemming from origins similar to Is-
raeli law, also provides no support for the ABL. Recall that, as 
a preliminary matter, American law distinguishes between po-
litical speech (strictly protected) and commercial speech (less 
protected).178 The boycotts targeted by the ABL are not com-
mercial expression, but are instead clear examples of political 
expression, representing protests of Israeli policies.179 There-
fore, through the lens of American law, the ABL would still fail 
as it is entitled to the same strict, “near certainty” standard 
applied in Israeli law.180 
However, even under American law’s more permissive com-
mercial expression standard, the ABL cannot pass muster. As 
noted in Part III.B, United States courts have permitted gov-
ernment prohibition on boycott participation, but only where 
the boycotts in question are secondary, and not related to the 
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individual’s political rights.181 Similar to the ABL, the EAA 
presents the possibility of enforcing pecuniary penalties on par-
ties advocating for a boycott.182 However, the ABL and Ameri-
can anti-boycott legislation are easily distinguishable. Crucial-
ly, the ABL is a ban on domestic boycotting of domestic busi-
ness (primary), while the American regulations concern partic-
ipation in foreign boycotts (secondary).183 Primary boycotts 
merit a court’s protection far more than participation in a sec-
ondary boycott because domestic boycotts are an avenue for 
participation in one’s own government, a practice firmly estab-
lished as a fundamental right.184 However, participation in a 
secondary boycott has been established as a non-political ex-
pression.185 Therefore, while America does have anti-boycott 
regulations in force, they would not justify a law analogous to 
Israel’s ABL. 
Nor does International law provide justification for the ABL. 
Similar to both Israeli and American law, international law has 
provided for the fundamental right to participate in one’s gov-
ernment.186 As described above, the ABL represents an imper-
missible violation of an individual’s right to participate in de-
mocracy.187 The ABL thus runs afoul of the principles of inter-
national law and cannot be justified as an appropriate re-
striction of the Israeli populace’s right to express themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
The ABL is a violation of the right to free expression, wheth-
er analyzed from an Israeli, American, Jewish, or international 
perspective. To impinge on such a fundamental human right, 
particularly as it pertains to participation in the political pro-
cess, is an impermissible blow to the power of the individual. 
Furthermore, given that the ABL lacks support from the inter-
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national community upon whom Israel relies for financial con-
tributions, continued adherence to the ABL could have disas-
trous effects on Israel as a whole. Therefore, when considering 
the legal and practical concerns posed by the ABL,188 it is clear 
that the Supreme Court should strike down the law as uncon-
stitutional. 
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